ENGAGING WITH THE ENEMY FOR THE COMMON GOOD

by Jehan Perera
Two years and three months into the six year term of the Rajapaksa government the denunciation of those who continue to urge a negotiated political solution to the ethnic conflict is at a peak. The belief that a military solution alone might suffice to end the three decades long Tamil rebellion has regained the centre stage as it has at various times in the past. The views propagated by the Sinhalese nationalist JVP and JHU that a military solution is the desirable one appears to have been taken on by the government.
So long as the LTTE remains committed to achieving a separate state by military means, there is a logical basis to the government’s determination to retake territory under LTTE control. A unilateral declaration of independence, such as made by Kosovo over the weekend, only makes sense if the rebel organization controls substantial territory on the ground. By retaking the east, and keeping Jaffna, by dint of the military power of the Sri Lankan state, the government has effectively forestalled this option by the LTTE. On the other hand, the better option would be a negotiated political settlement in which both separation and resort to arms are given up.
The Rajapaksa government has also adopted another position upheld by the JVP and JHU, which is the commitment to the unitary state. Over the past six decades of Sri Lankan independence, the issue of the unitary state has dogged ethnic relations in the country. The Tamil perception of the unitary state is that it permits centralized rule which is also Sinhalese majoritarian rule. On the other hand the Sinhalese perception of the unitary state is that it guarantees the legal unity of the country, whatever may be the ground reality. However, from 1995 onwards, the Sinhalese willingness to contemplate a solution beyond the unitary state had been growing.
In the period 1995-2005 under former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, opinion polls showed that upwards of 70 percent of the population surveyed were in favour of the devolution of powers as a solution to the ethnic conflict. Although most of this period saw a high level of conflict between the government and LTTE, President Kumaratunga was successful in keeping the forces of Sinhalese nationalism at bay. But now these forces have taken the political centre stage and the pernicious consequences are felt everywhere, not least on the human rights record that ruin the country’s international image.
FEARFUL ENVIRONMENT
Both in his 2005 election manifesto and in his latest statements to the public, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has repeated his determination to find a political solution within the framework of the unitary state alone. He has also linked his commitment to the unitary state to the JVP and JHU’s commitment to a military solution that would eliminate the LTTE threat to the unity of the country. The LTTE’s response has been to use violence, both in the form of conventional warfare and terror strikes which have led to a polarized situation in the country. Hatred and suspicion have taken centre stage in an environment of violence and fear.
On the weekend as I enjoyed the early morning hours in the park near where I live, I heard a raucous noise. Not thinking it was for me, I continued with my jog. But on the next round it was unmistakable. The sound coming from across the distance was “traitor, traitor.” I could not see who it was because the sound came from between parked cars. But whoever it was wanted to make it known that I was the target. “Jehan Perera, traitor, traitor”, he shouted. This was a person giving vent to a primeval passion.
The present period can be considered the worst ever in the post-independence history of Sri Lanka where it concerns a mutually acceptable solution to the ethnic conflict. The forces of extreme Sinhalese nationalism have taken the centre stage. It seems that hardly a day passes without sections of the media, including the state-controlled media, assailing those who continue to advocate a negotiated political solution to the ethnic conflict to both the government and LTTE. Former President Kumaratunga has been quoted in the Sunday Leader newspaper as saying, “The JVP and JHU are marginal forces with less than 5 percent of the total vote. It is this 5 percent that is making decisions today on behalf of about 90 percent. This is not even democratic.”
In this context, the recent disclosure of a possible JVP-LTTE link would come as a considerable surprise. The Daily Mirror recently reported a court case in which a former army general has alleged JVP-LTTE collaboration during the period of the bloody JVP insurrection against the government in 1988-89 that led to tens of thousands of deaths. The newspaper reported that “Major General (Wasantha) Perera had compiled a report outlining the close terrorist connection between the JVP and LTTE during the 1988-89 period.” The general had also given evidence before the court that the JVP had obtained arms from the LTTE and because of his efforts he was able to cut off the procurement of arms by the JVP.
SELF INTEREST
However, it is not only the JVP that stands accused of such collaboration. Shortly after the Presidential election of 2005 allegations began to surface that the LTTE had been provided with some inducement to block Tamil voters in the north and east from casting their votes, which would almost certainly have gone to the opposition candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe. Former government minister Sripathy Sooriyarachchi who crossed over to the opposition and recently died in a motor accident publicly accused top government members of having bribed the LTTE to intimidate the Tamil voters away from the polls.
Another President who fought the LTTE with determination was President Ranasinghe Premadasa. But he too was accused of having collaborated with the LTTE in the period 1989-90 to ensure the departure of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces. President Premadasa was accused of having supplied t6he LTTE with weapons to fight against the IPKF and hasten their departure. This alleged government collaboration took place during a period when there was much suspicion that the Indian army would never leave Sri Lanka.
It might seem contradictory that those who advocate war against the LTTE and been publicly opposed them should also secretly collaborate with them. In all such instances of alleged collaboration there has been a common self-interest. Each party who collaborated with the LTTE did so temporarily, to either strengthen themselves or to weaken their opponents. While each of the collaborating parties may have achieved their short term goals, the end result was the strengthening of the LTTE’s capacity to wage war against them, and the growth of its mistrust in such partners in crime. The problem with the secret collaboration based on self interest alone was that it was not tied to a greater common purpose that could keep the parties together in the longer term.
This greater common purpose would be for the parties to work together to achieve a peaceful solution that could meet their own interests and the best interests of the people. Violence on both sides of the conflict has decreased the chances of reaching a peaceful, stable and lasting solution. Individuals and organizations who promote a negotiated political solution that includes the LTTE, do so for the purpose of a mutually acceptable political solution in which human rights are respected and the use of weapons will be ended. They work on the basis that even the most complicated and intense conflicts can be solved through negotiations.