Is India really Sri Lanka’s friend?

by Shenali Waduge
India doesn’t dislike Sri Lanka but it likes Tamil Nadu better – this really has been the central theme that has underlined Sri Lanka’s epic & which will explain why Sri Lanka’s LTTE is unlikely to suffer the defeat that the people of the country are so looking forward to. Sri Lanka should have learnt from the Vadamarachchi debacle ... Indian violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty when it entered Sri Lanka’s territory to make that infamous parippu drop on the North of Sri Lanka citing humanitarian concerns when we are well aware that thousands of Indians remain in abject poverty.
It is looking back at the past that increases the fear that we may see a different sort of “parippu drop” from India in the light of the series of successes by the Sri Lanka armed forces on the LTTE that has even left a possibly maimed & ailing Prabakaran.
An end in sight & erstwhile peace !!!.... not if India can help it, it seems. Let us hope this will not become the fate of Sri Lanka. Ivor Jennings claimed that the Sinhalese ruling elite in history looked upon India as “a mountain that might, at any time, send down destructive avalanches”. The “avalanches” first came in the form of “parippu” , what should we expect next? It may be perhaps this reason that we can say that India is one of the very few countries, if not the only country, that has or had unfriendly relationship with every one of its neighbors.

Where India’s policy for Sri Lanka experienced any difference is questionable but in truth we are well aware that India does not want Sri Lanka to be a force in its own right.

It is usually fear that beckons a country to change its policy towards another. But why should India fear Sri Lanka? India is over 50 times larger than Sri Lanka in terms of area & population. Undeniable is the 20 mile stretch (often called the “strategic highway”) that divides the two countries thus denoting the geographical closeness of the two countries.

In the five decades of relations following independence both countries has experienced spicy relations. The period before that too experienced frequent invasions from Tamil Nadu resulting in the destruction of Sinhala Buddhist civilization leading to cross-country ethnic linkages & of course the element of fear in the minds of the Sinhalese. However, India can never ignore the sentiments of Tamil Nadu & national politics has always been determined by the pressures of Tamil Nadu & all of its leaders.

The mid-80s accounted for the most tense relations between Sri Lanka & India but for the most part bilateral relations have been revolving around co-operation & friendships but the irritants & differences remained an active force. The first issue was the statelessness of Indian Tamils who came during the British rule to work on the plantations, and then it was the Kachchativu issue, a barren island in the Palk Strait which remained unresolved till 1974 when India acceded to Sri Lanka’s claim over the Kachchativu Island under the maritime agreement signed on 26 June 1974. The next issue that highlighted disagreement between the two nations naturally related to the security perceptions & policies of both countries. India did not welcome Sri Lanka’s allegiance with any Western power in particular where it concerned the use of the natural harbour located in Trincomalee. India was always sensitive when it came to its security.

These “issues” were harmless in the light of the most turbulent times that experienced extremes in relations between the two nations. It was the July 83 violence that helped the LTTE upgrade itself to the international arena & launched the “ethnic” claim for a separate homeland for the Tamils. The Tamil factor vis a vis the Tamil Nadu involvement immediately necessitated India’s aggression towards the Sri Lankan Government, making J R Jaywardena seek US support by extending refuelling & recreation facilities to the US naval ships in Trincomalee. This was followed by the agreement with US in 1983 December to set up a powerful Voice of America radio station. The act further aggravated India’s annoyance in view of India’s concerns that the VOA would be used for intelligence purposes by the US.
The reality check for Sri Lanka was that while countries like the US, UK, China & Pakistan were agreeable to supply arms, provide training to the Sri Lanka Army etc... none of them were prepared to become Sri Lanka’s strategic partner. India was more important & India’s version of Sri Lanka’s problem was accepted. It was only the anti-India movers like China & Pakistan who were agreeable to providing “limited” military support & upon whom Sri Lanka remains indebted to a great degree.

Yet “diplomacy” was able to act as a cover-up during times of tension & the world witnessed scores of statements being issued by both parties claiming the “great ties” between the two.

India has gone to great lengths to cripple Sri Lanka’s development. To be fair by India the modern efforts to destabilise Sri Lanka politically started with Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Research & Analysis Wing (Raw) was created in 1968 working directly under the Indian Prime Minister. It was Mrs. Indira Gandhi who gave it a dynamic role – to undertake covert operations in neighboring countries. For this purpose it was given a virtual carte blanche & a budget that is never discussed in public forums. This is why the RAW becomes more fearsome than the KGB, CIA, Mossad or the MI-6. The destabilizing operations in neighboring countries meant Bangladesh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Pakistan, Maldives & Sri Lanka were to be the RAWs target for covert operations. Whether it was political dissent, ethnic divisions, economic backwardness, criminal elements – the ultimate aim was to stage-manage the future events of these countries. This was India’s (Indira’s) doctrine. It was to ascertain India’s supremacy over all South Asian nations. There has emerged another doctrine formulated by M K Narayan the Indian National Security Advisor (Narayan Doctrine) stating that Sri Lanka must purchase all its weapons from only India – once again tantamount to bullying Sri Lanka.

Using the Research & Analyst Wing or RAW as it is better known, it was Mrs. Gandhi who gave explicit instructions to create the LTTE. The RAW set up camps in Tamil Nadu, organized old RAW guerrillas as trainers, armed the LTTE & trained them in centers such as Gunda, Gorakpur & even Tamil Nadu. LTTE then moved on to more sophisticated training in Lebanon (reported in 1990 by Russian Gen Mikhail Barsukov), Libya & Syria. There was also a time in 1985 when the Israelis were simultaneously training the Sri Lanka Army & the Tamil tigers as well as providing arms to each (Victor Ostrovsky author of By Way of Deception, Mossad training for the tigers were arranged by India) as was the British Special Air Services (SAS) firm Keenie Meenie Services.
It is also interesting to note RAWs role in building up the EPRLF to fight against the LTTE thus making the situation more volatile.

The aim of India was to see the insurgency increase in the North & East, the Sri Lankan Government to take action which would immediate have the foreign aid donors to apply pressure upon the Government citing humanitarian concerns & ultimately again lead to a Catch 22 situation. Thereafter, India was quick to adopt a two-pronged strategy of persuasion & coercion on both the Sri Lankan Government & the LTTE. But, if India is not looking to create a separate state in Sri Lanka what really is their game – why encourage & abate the confusion they created to continue?

The peace accord on 29 July 1987 may have been one option engineered between Rajiv Gandhi (the Young Fox) & J R Jayawardena (the Old Fox) & signalled on ink India’s role in Sri Lanka’s conflict vis a vis the India Doctrine. The agreement obviously addressed India’s concerns of Sri Lanka allowing those that threatened its security to be located in Sri Lanka. So this was India’s way of bringing Sri Lanka to book. It demonstrated India’s desire for regional hegemony & for Sri Lanka to remain “dependent” on India for its “security” and “survival”. Sri Lanka was forced to enter a foster home. Then perhaps we can understand the emergence of the Sinhala hard-liners who questioned why Sri Lanka had to compromise its independence & sovereignty to make India feel “secure”?
With the signing of the Agreement Sri Lanka saw the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force of 8000 men on 30th July 1987. The unpreparedness of the Indian troops was evident when they did not even have a map of the North & had to request same from the Sri Lanka Army. Aware of the LTTE’s stand regarding the Agreement, J R Jayawardena was seen the merrier for not having to commit any of the Sri Lankan forces to the onslaughts by the LTTE which the IPKF had to face. The cost of India’s intervention was heavy & India lost more than 1200 soldiers & many of its officers as well. India had to also spend more than $180million on an operation that was not really their concern. The tragedy was the alarming number of civilian deaths & injuries – how could the IPKF know what LTTE guerrilla’s looked like? It became a thankless job for the IPKF & the Sinhalese & the Tamils were in agreement for their hatred for the IPKF & prompted President Premadasa’s unceremonious expulsion of the IPKF in March 1990 from Sri Lanka. It was a bitter experience for a country used to dictating terms to its smaller nation. By the time the IPKF left contrary to what the Government expected Sri Lanka had lost more territory that the Sri Lankan forces were able to hold against the LTTE.

If there were any fears in the past regarding India one can justify the present fears regarding India’s role in Sri Lanka. The IPKF experience has to a considerable extent forced India not to take a direct role in the conflict & which may well explain why India did not object to Norway’s role as peace facilitators. Let it be reiterated that Norway did not pose any threat to India. But, Sri Lanka’s envoys had to face endless trips to India to give “briefings” on what was really happening in Sri Lanka – once again to suit the Indian Doctrine. On one occasion when Japan offered to come forward as facilitator, India was quick to point out the Japanese assistance should only be confined to financial assistance for development.

We then enter the most puzzling question of the LTTE’s decision to kill Rajiv Gandhi & ask Why should Prabakaran decide to kill Shri Rajiv Gandhi?

Had he a premonition of the startling revelation given in Maj. Gen. Harikirat Singh’s (1st Commander of the IPKF) book Intervention in Sri Lanka (1997) of an order (twice repeated) in September 1987 by India’s High Commissioner in Colombo J. N. Dixit (on Rajiv Gandhi’s orders) to exterminate Prabakaran when he was to come for a meeting in Palaly? Possibly an alternative to Prabakaran had been sought by the RAW, so If this order was actually given, it immediately raises the question why the orders were not carried out. The reason was that an unarmed man is never shot. We can understand why an in-serviceman would so refuse to do something against international law but then the RAW could have undertaken the “order” since they were instrumental in creating the LTTE. However, it certainly does make us wonder whether Sri Lanka would have been any different had the orders to kill Prabakaran been carried out!

The LTTE did decide to terminate the life of India’s signatory to the Indo-Lanka Accord & Shri Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. LTTE became a banned entity in India & Prabakaran became India’s most wanted man.

Simultaneously, bilateral relations also saw an improvement – trade agreements, military assistance & training, economic & cultural ties all saw a surge & the formulation of the comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA). Following the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002, in June India offered a credit line of $100million for purchase of capital goods, consumer services & food items from India. This was followed by another $30million in 2003. Most saw India’s links as another motive to show its presence in Sri Lanka from a different angle. Visible today is the Indian presence in Sri Lanka, the opening of major business establishments like the IOC down to the increase in Indian tourist arrivals.

We can now well understand India’s role in Sri Lanka vis a vis anything that is happening within the country – from internal conflict, to economy, education or culture – India wants to have its presence shown & felt.

Does India really understand the dangers of what they have created? Obviously not, with the years of internal conflict India is also experiencing in the examples of Jammu & Kashmir, the Naxalites, other boundary clashes & a rise in terrorists threats internally, India still wishes to play the role of a bully.

Today, the LTTE does not require India’s assistance – they have built for themselves a very lucrative network of offices in London, Paris, Toronto & Ontario. Its trademark terror tactics include the suicide cadres, car bombings & the cyanide capsule to be taken if captured. Its leader Prabakaran having taken a country through almost 30 years of civil strife has naturally aged & suffers ailments like diabetes & rumors of injuries sustained during successive air raids may have even left him minus a limb which then leads to the question of succession. Leaving aside the effectiveness of the LTTE international network to garner funds for the “cause” it was undoubtedly Prabakaran’s leadership that was able to hold the unit together whether by fear or by will of its cadres, thus the question of passing reign becomes an even more important dilemma – will the successor be able to provide similar leadership & more importantly hold the unit together. We must remember that unlike the changes in Government & leaders, the LTTE has had & known only one leader & are they emotionally prepared to be energized under another becomes a meaningful question. There is also Sri Lanka’s own covert operation that has succeeded in eliminating many tiger leaders leaving a movement with a decreasing leadership ladder. The LTTE is said to now have 15,000 cadres most of whom are children. Despite years of statistics flowing to & fro the UN is still to take realistic actions against the LTTE for child recruitment.

Sri Lanka has also been trying all sorts of avenues to change the mindset of the international community - from exposing the links the LTTE has with Al Qaeda, the Libyan connection, the Naxalites & the Khalistani Liberation Force have helped in the arrests of several fund raisers in the US & Canada. But, much more efforts are needed to make any real impact.

The LTTE connections to narcotics trade in Bombay, Turkey, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Canada & the US has also been highlighted as a means to procure arms. During the 1990s Interpol reported over 600 such cases involving the tamil tigers.

Most of the arms used by the LTTE are purchased from India, Afghanistan, Singapore, Vietnam & the MidEast. Then there was also a time in 1989 when President Premadasa himself sought assistance from the LTTE by supplying it arms to help expel the IPKF from the North & even to wipe out the JVP during its insurgency.

Events have shown that the church and its allied organisations have lent patent and latent support to the LTTE even to the extent of transporting suicide kits by its clergymen which may explain why one such leader an American national Kenneth Mulder was arrested in Sri Lanka in July 1995. There is also allegations that even the ICRC & other NGOs also have links to the movement. In 1995 the ICRC refused to put its food ships through Government security checks in Kankesanthurai triggering the suspicion that the food bound for Point Pedro was for the LTTE.
Then the expatriate role needs to also be highlighted. Following the July 83 riots a large number were given refugee status in Western climes. This number increased over the years as the strife reached different scales. With a diaspora now settled & making a living it was only time that the LTTE would see how easily they could garner financial support even from those Tamils unwilling to “cooperate”. It is this diaspora that does not want to see a “peaceful” Sri Lanka which would immediately mean them having to return that keeps alive the LTTE cause & projects to the Western world that Tamils are being discriminated. For a man who has engaged the Sri Lankan Government as well as the Indian Government through 25 years of strife is a man has never escaped the threat to his life. His lists of assassinations & killings in addition to the scores of young children his men forcefully enrol into the LTTE, naturally makes him a “wanted man” himself. Having to hide amongst his own cadres makes Prabakaran’s existence vulnerable & as his health is seen to deteriorate the questions of heir to the movement is also very much in the air & these fears naturally will trickle down to the bottom lines of his cadres. The RAW under instructions to destabilize Sri Lanka was quick to see how the “ethnic” tension could be “utilized” for their purpose & thus the youth who started voicing their disagreements with the Sri Lankan Government were soon carved into a movement we know as the LTTE & the rest is of course history.

Things don’t work out well all the time. India was soon to find the LTTE action was not confined to Sri Lanka alone. LTTE also had its eyes on India & in particular Tamil Nadu. How could India forget that the real homeland for Tamils was in fact the State of Tamil Nadu – it would always be of historical significance to them? Would that then nullify India’s toying with the idea of an annexure of Sri Lanka citing territorial insecurity?

What India has created in arming the LTTE is a Goliath. If India expected gratitude for giving birth to its existence India was in for a harsh reality check. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE’s deadly suicide cadre & within Tamil Nadu itself the LTTE is making its presence felt stirring fear in the corridors of the Central Government.

Could the words of J.R. Jayewardene, former President, who said in 1954 that “History has shown that adventures and men with imperialistic ideas may at any moment gain control of the reins of government in a state, and if that happens in India, the smaller nations that are her neighbours would have to seek protection not from external aggression but from Indian aggression” be true?

There is also a scenario where the hunter is hunted & as Prabakaran himself faces such a predicament, India that has taken pride in how it has crippled a tiny nation & created a volatile country & hatred amongst its communities may face similar consequences. Unknowingly India too is in fear of facing similar threats by a larger power in China which has threatened to take over India’s Arunachal Pradesh. Let us see how whether India Doctrine will change to meet that risk?

While we once again ponder whether India has really been a friend to us, it would also be good for India to ask whether it still wishes to continue with its India Doctrine & face the perpetual “doubts” of India’s hidden role & interference by its South Asian neighbors?